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I. INTRODUCTION
The Texas Supreme Court has consistently described mandamus as
“both an extraordinary remedy and a discretionary one.”1 To obtain man-
damus relief respecting an action of a Texas court, the party seeking relief
must generally show both that the lower court’s action constituted an
abuse of discretion and that “appeal is an inadequate remedy.”2 The first
of those requirements, i.e., an abuse of discretion, is “fulfilled where a
* Justice, Retired, Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas; Dorsey & Whitney, LLP,
Dallas, Texas. B.S.B.A., Drake University; J.D., University of Missouri. Prior to joining the
bench, Justice Lang was a partner in the Dallas office of Gardere Wynne Sewell L.L.P.
Justice Lang clerked for the Hon. Fred L. Henley of the Supreme Court of Missouri from
May 1972 to May 1973.
** Staff Attorney, Fifth District Court of Appeals of Texas. B.S., Arizona State Uni-
versity; J.D., Southern Methodist University Dedman School of Law.
1. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (cit-
ing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 138 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
2. Id. (citing In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 135–36).
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[lower] court acts without reference to guiding rules or principles or in an
arbitrary or unreasonable manner.”3 As to the second requirement, i.e.,
lack of an adequate remedy by appeal, “no specific definition captures
the essence of or circumscribes what [constitutes] an ‘adequate’ rem-
edy.”4 Rather, the term “‘adequate’ is merely a proxy for the careful bal-
ance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate
courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of
lower courts”5 and “its meaning ‘depends heavily on the circumstances
presented.’”6 “[A]n ‘adequate’ appellate remedy exists when ‘any bene-
fits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’”7
During the two-year Survey period of this article, December 1, 2016,
through November 30, 2018, the supreme court delivered seventeen opin-
ions in mandamus cases addressing actions by courts.8 This article ana-
lyzes, summarizes, and categorizes those seventeen opinions to examine
and describe the supreme court’s current decisional approach to manda-
mus respecting lower court actions, with particular focus on the require-
ment that an adequate appellate remedy is missing. Six of those
seventeen opinions pertain to discovery,9 including an opinion in which
the supreme court described for the first time detailed guidelines on the
required format for production of electronic data.10 The other subject
matter categories to which those opinions pertain include designation of
responsible third parties,11 granting of a motion for new trial,12 trial court
3. See id.
4. Id.
5. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 509 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)
(quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
6. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 840 (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 137).
7. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 509 (quoting In re Prudential, 148 S.W.3d at 136).
8. Those cases are as follows: In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 563 S.W.3d 216 (Tex.
2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re State, 556 S.W.3d 821 (Tex. 2018) (orig. pro-
ceeding); In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d 518 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Dawson,
550 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Mahindra, USA Inc., 549
S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr. Operating Co., 559
S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 836; In re Elizondo,
544 S.W.3d 824 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Shipman, 540 S.W.3d 562
(Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. 2018) (orig.
proceeding); In re Accident Fund Gen. Ins. Co., 543 S.W.3d 750 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam)
(orig. proceeding); In re Turner, 542 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceed-
ing); In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 506; In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 532 S.W.3d 794 (Tex.
2017) (orig. proceeding); In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d 452 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding);
In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding); In re Red Dot
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 504 S.W.3d 320 (Tex. 2016) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
9. See In re N. Cypress Med. Ctr., 559 S.W.3d at 129; In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 837;
In re Shipman, 540 S.W.3d at 564; In re Silver, 540 S.W.3d at 532; In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins.
Co., 532 S.W.3d at 798; In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 598–99.
10. See In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d at 608–12.
11. See In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d at 628; In re Xerox Corp., 555 S.W.3d at 520; In re
Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 507.
12. See In re Davenport, 522 S.W.3d at 454.
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jurisdiction/authority,13 appointment or disqualification of counsel,14 and
challenges to the lawsuit forum.15
II. MANDAMUS FUNDAMENTALS
The Texas Supreme Court’s jurisdiction over writs of mandamus stems
from the Texas constitution.16 Specifically, section three of article five
states, in part, (1) “under such regulations as may be prescribed by law,”
the supreme court and its justices “may issue the writs of mandamus . . .
and such other writs, as may be necessary to enforce its jurisdiction,” and
(2) the Texas Legislature may confer original jurisdiction on the supreme
court to “issue writs of . . . mandamus in such cases as may be specified,
except as against the Governor of the State.”17
Consistent with those constitutional grants of authority, Section
22.002(a) of the Texas Government Code provides that the supreme court
or a justice of the supreme court
may issue . . . all writs of . . . mandamus agreeable to the principles of
law regulating those writs, against a statutory county court judge, a
statutory probate court judge, a district judge, a court of appeals or a
justice of a court of appeals, or any officer of state government ex-
cept the governor, the court of criminal appeals, or a judge of the
court of criminal appeals.18
Further, Government Code Section 22.002 states (1) “[t]he supreme court
or, in vacation, a justice of the supreme court may issue a writ of manda-
mus to compel a statutory county court judge, a statutory probate court
judge, or a district judge to proceed to trial and judgment in a case,” and
(2)
[o]nly the supreme court has the authority to issue a writ of manda-
mus . . . against any of the officers of the executive departments of
the government of this state to order or compel the performance of a
judicial, ministerial, or discretionary act or duty that, by state law,
the officer or officers are authorized to perform.19
13. See In re Castle Tex. Prod., 563 S.W.3d at 218; In re Elizondo, 544 S.W.3d at 825;
In re Accident Fund Gen. Ins. Co., 543 S.W.3d at 751; In re Red Dot Bldg. Sys., 504 S.W.3d
at 322.
14. See In re State, 556 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding); In re Turner,
542 S.W.3d 553, 554 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
15. See In re Mahindra, USA Inc., 549 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding).
16. See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 1, 3, 6(a).
17. Id. § 3. Also, section six of article five provides in part that the intermediate appel-
late courts of Texas shall have “appellate jurisdiction co-extensive with the limits of their
respective districts” and “such other jurisdiction, original and appellate, as may be pre-
scribed by law.” Id. § 6(a).
18. TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 22.002(a).
19. Id. § 22.002(b)–(c). The mandamus jurisdiction of the Texas courts of appeals is
less broad than that of the supreme court. Specifically, pursuant to Government Code Sec-
tion 22.221, (1) each of the fourteen courts of appeals or a justice thereof “may issue a writ
of mandamus and all other writs necessary to enforce the jurisdiction of the court,” and (2)
each court of appeals may issue writs of mandamus against “a judge of a district, statutory
county, statutory probate county, or county court in the court of appeals district” and cer-
tain magistrates and associate judges. Id. § 22.221 (a)–(b).
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Additionally, a number of Texas statutes and rules provide for mandamus
proceedings in certain courts as to specifically identified matters.20
The procedural requirements for mandamus proceedings in both the
supreme court and the courts of appeals are set out in Texas Rule of
Appellate Procedure 52.21 If the supreme court and a court of appeals
have concurrent mandamus jurisdiction, “the petition must be presented
first to the court of appeals unless there is a compelling reason not to do
so,” which reason must be stated in the petition.22 Further, failure to
comply with the additional requirements of Rule 52 may result in denial
of relief.23
III. MANDAMUS STATISTICS
The Texas Supreme Court’s 2018 fiscal year, which is the most recent
fiscal year for which statistics are available, ran from September 1, 2017
to August 31, 2018. During that fiscal year, 215 new petitions for writ of
mandamus were filed in the supreme court.24 Dispositions were made in
217 mandamus cases.25 Of those 217 petitions for writ of mandamus dis-
posed of, 15, or 6.9%, were conditionally granted and 166, or 76.5%, were
denied.26
20. See, e.g., In re Occidental Chem. Corp., 561 S.W.3d 146, 153 (Tex. 2018) (orig.
proceeding) (concluding statute that gives supreme court original jurisdiction to hear and
determine certain suits involving imposition of ad valorem taxes by multiple taxing units
on same property confers original mandamus jurisdiction in supreme court); City of Hous-
ton v. Houston Mun. Emps. Pension Sys., 549 S.W.3d 566, 570, 576, 583–84 (Tex. 2018)
(affirming denial of city’s plea to jurisdiction where suit for mandamus was proper pro-
ceeding to compel disclosure of information pursuant to Texas Public Information Act and
other nondiscretionary governmental action required by law); In re Nestle USA, Inc., 387
S.W.3d 610, 617 (Tex. 2012) (orig. proceeding) (concluding statutory language allowed for
supreme court mandamus review of constitutionality of franchise tax statute); TEX. R. APP.
P. 24.4(a) (a party may seek supreme court mandamus review of court of appeals’ ruling on
motion challenging trial court’s determination of amount of security required to supersede
judgment); TEX. ELEC. CODE ANN. § 273.061 (“supreme court or a court of appeals may
issue a writ of mandamus to compel the performance of any duty imposed by law in con-
nection with the holding of an election or a political party convention, regardless of
whether the person responsible for performing the duty is a public officer”).
21. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52. The party seeking relief in a mandamus proceeding is the
relator and “the person against whom relief is sought . . . is the respondent.” Id. “A person
whose interest would be directly affected by the relief sought is a real party in interest and
a party to the case. . . .” Id.
22. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.3(e); see also State v. Naylor, 466 S.W.3d 783, 793–94 (Tex.
2015) (orig. proceeding) (“a party may not circumvent the court of appeals simply by argu-
ing futility”).
23. See, e.g., In re Charboneau, No. 05-18-00551-CV, 2018 WL 2276226, at *1–2 (Tex.
App.—Dallas May 18, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); In re Phillips, No. 05-18-00543-
CV, 2018 WL 2213888, at *1–3 (Tex. App.—Dallas May 15, 2018, orig. proceeding) (mem.
op.); In re Wade, No. 05-17-00046-CV, 2017 WL 462364, at *1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Feb. 2,
2017, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.).
24. See Texas Supreme Court 2018 Annual Statistical Report, http://www.txcourts.gov/
media/1442689/sc-activity-2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/QN48-NCK6].
25. Id. Dispositions can include petitions for writ of mandamus filed in previous fiscal
years and not disposed of during those fiscal years. See id.
26. Id. Petitions otherwise disposed of were dismissed, abated, or struck. See id.
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The chart directly below shows a comparison of those numbers with
statistics for the six preceding fiscal years. As illustrated by the chart,
there has been only a slight fluctuation in the number of new petitions for
writ of mandamus filed during that seven-year period. Further, the chart
shows that, consistent with its description of mandamus as an extraordi-
nary remedy, the supreme court generally grants less than eight percent
of the petitions for writ of mandamus presented to it each fiscal year.
Texas Supreme Court Mandamus Statistics: Past Seven Fiscal Years
FISCAL YEAR 2018 2017 2016 2015 2014 2013 2012 
New petitions filed 215 187 188 220 219 219 214 
Total dispositions27 217 181 194 225 216 222 221 
Petitions denied 76.5% 79% 79.8% 72% 81.9% 78.8% 73% 
Petitions granted 6.9% 6.6% 6.7% 7.5% 5.5% 2.2% 6.3% 
In the seventeen opinions issued during the Survey period that are spe-
cifically addressed in this article, the Texas Supreme Court granted the
petition for writ of mandamus in twelve cases and denied the petition for
writ of mandamus in the remaining five cases. The supreme court heard
oral argument in four of the eleven cases in which it granted relief and in
three of the five cases in which it denied relief.28
IV. SUBJECT MATTER CATEGORIES OF RECENT TEXAS
SUPREME COURT MANDAMUS CASES INVOLVING
STANDARD OF ALLEGED ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AND NO ADEQUATE REMEDY BY APPEAL
A. DISCOVERY
In re State Farm Lloyds29 established a new standard for determining
the format for production of electronic data during discovery. That case
involved electronic discovery in two consolidated cases in which residen-
tial homeowners sued their insurer, State Farm, “alleging underpayment
of insured hail-damage claims.” Upon request by the homeowners, the
trial court ordered State Farm to produce electronically stored informa-
tion (ESI) in its “native or near-native forms . . . regardless of whether a
more convenient, less expensive, and ‘reasonably usable’ format [was]
readily available.”30 After being denied mandamus relief in the Corpus
Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals, State Farm filed petitions for manda-
mus in the Texas Supreme Court respecting both cases.
27. As described above, dispositions for a particular fiscal year can include petitions
for writ of mandamus filed in previous fiscal years and not disposed of during those fiscal
years. Further, the dispositions in this chart include petitions for writs of mandamus dis-
missed, abated, struck, or withdrawn during the respective fiscal year. See id.
28. See TEX. R. APP. P. 52.8(b)(4) (“the court may set the case for oral argument”).
29. 520 S.W.3d 595, 615 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).
30. Id. at 600–01.
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The supreme court held that when electronic data in “a reasonably usa-
ble form is readily available in the ordinary course of business, a trial
court must assess,” on a case-by-case basis, “whether any enhanced bur-
den or expense associated with a requested form is justified when
weighed against the proportional needs of the case.”31 Further, the su-
preme court described a list of seven factors to be considered in such
analyses and addressed each factor in detail.32 The factors are as follows:
(1) the likely benefit of the requested discovery; (2) the needs of the case;
(3) the amount in controversy; (4) the parties’ resources; (5) the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation; (6) the importance of the
proposed discovery in resolving the litigation; and (7) any other articul-
able factor bearing on proportionality.33 The supreme court concluded
that ruling on the merits would be inappropriate since it only now ex-
pressed an opinion on the matter, and thus denied the request without
prejudice so that the trial court could reconsider in light of the opinion.34
Although the supreme court did not specifically address the element of
no adequate remedy by appeal, it cited In re CSX Corp., a prior manda-
mus case in which it concluded that where a trial court compels produc-
tion of “patently irrelevant or duplicative documents” no adequate
remedy by appeal exists because the burden imposed is “far out of pro-
portion to any benefit that may obtain to the requesting party.”35
In In re National Lloyds Insurance Co.,36 the Texas Supreme Court ad-
dressed the discoverability of attorney-billing information. A discovery
dispute arose in the context of multidistrict litigation against several in-
surers based on insured homeowners’ allegations of underpaid insurance
claims. At issue was “whether a party’s attorney-billing information is dis-
coverable when the party challenges an opposing party’s attorney fee re-
quest as unreasonable . . . but neither uses its own attorney fees as a
comparator nor seeks to recover any portion of its own attorney fees.”37
The supreme court concluded that “under such circumstances, (1) com-
pelling en masse production of a party’s billing records invades the attor-
ney work-product privilege; (2) the privilege is not waived merely
because the party resisting discovery has challenged the opponent’s attor-
ney fee request; and (3) such information is ordinarily not discovera-
ble.”38 Further, the supreme court stated “[t]o the extent factual
information about hourly rates and aggregate attorney fees is not privi-
leged, that information is generally irrelevant and nondiscoverable be-
cause it does not establish or tend to establish the reasonableness or
31. Id. at 607.
32. See id. at 607–12.
33. See id. at 608–12.
34. Id. at 615.
35. Id. at 604 n.21 (citing In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 153 (Tex. 2003) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
36. 532 S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).
37. Id. at 798.
38. Id. at 798–99.
2019] Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions 413
necessity of the attorney fees an opposing party has incurred.”39 The su-
preme court conditionally granted the insurers’ petition for mandamus
relief and directed the trial court to vacate its order allowing discovery of
such information. The supreme court did not specifically address the ele-
ment of no adequate remedy by appeal, but cited the prior cases of In re
National Lloyds Insurance Co.40 and In re Living Centers of Texas, Inc.41
In re Silver42 involved the applicability of the lawyer-client privilege to
communications with a patent agent. A purported inventor of a certain
technology, Silver, filed a breach of contract action against Tabletop Me-
dia, LLC. Silver alleged he had sold Tabletop a patent respecting the
technology in question and Tabletop had failed to pay him. During dis-
covery, “Tabletop sought production of emails between Silver and . . . the
patent agent who represented Silver before the [United States Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO)].”43 Although Silver did not dispute that his
patent agent was not a licensed attorney, Silver claimed the emails were
covered by the lawyer-client privilege.44 Tabletop moved to compel pro-
duction, which the trial court granted.45 After an unsuccessful attempt to
obtain mandamus relief in the Dallas Court of Appeals to “compel the
trial court to withdraw the production order,” Silver sought mandamus
relief in the Texas Supreme Court.
The supreme court’s analysis focused on the language of Texas Rule of
Evidence 503, which “states the basic elements of the lawyer-client privi-
lege.”46 The supreme court held that (1) “within the scope of their prac-
tice before the USPTO, patent agents practice law”; (2) “because patent
agents are authorized to practice law before the USPTO, they fall within
Rule 503’s definition of ‘lawyer’”; and (3) “as such, their clients may in-
voke the lawyer-client privilege to protect communications that fall
within the privilege’s scope.”47 However, the supreme court also stated
(1) “[t]he client’s communications with a registered patent agent regard-
ing matters outside the agent’s authorized practice area might not be pro-
tected because these communications are not necessarily made to
facilitate the rendition of professional legal services” and (2) when an in
camera review is necessary to determine whether a privilege applies, “the
trial court abuses its discretion when it fails to conduct an adequate in
camera inspection.”48 The supreme court concluded that “[t]o the extent
the trial court erroneously determined that no privilege applied” to the
39. Id.
40. 507 S.W.3d 219, 224 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (per curiam) (granting manda-
mus relief when trial court ordered discovery of irrelevant information).
41. 175 S.W.3d 253, 256 (Tex. 2005) (orig. proceeding) (granting mandamus relief
when trial court ordered discovery of privileged information).
42. 540 S.W.3d 530 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding).




47. Id. at 536, 538.
48. Id. at 539.
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documents in question and “ordered their wholesale production, without
first determining the client’s claim of privilege, the [trial] court abused its
discretion.”49 Additionally, the supreme court stated “when the trial
court orders production of privileged information, the party claiming the
privilege has no adequate appellate remedy.”50 The supreme court condi-
tionally granted mandamus relief and directed “the trial court to conduct
an appropriate in camera review and vacate its order to the extent it com-
pel[led] production of Silver’s privileged communications.”51
In re Shipman52 addressed the alleged lack of technical capability of a
producing party in a discovery dispute pertaining to electronically stored
information. Marion Shipman engaged with Jamie Shelton and others in
various business ventures over a period of several decades. Those busi-
ness dealings ceased in 2010. Approximately one year later, a bank sued
Shipman and Shelton seeking recovery of loans made to an automobile
dealership owned by Shelton that were guaranteed by Shipman. In 2014,
Shelton asserted third-party claims against Shipman in that litigation for
fraud, breach of contract, and breach of fiduciary duty.53 During discov-
ery, Shelton sought production of myriad records of Shipman pertaining
to Shipman’s business dealings. Although Shipman produced responsive
documents after receiving Shelton’s discovery requests, Shelton “was dis-
satisfied with Shipman’s production and filed a motion to compel.”54 In
July 2015, the trial court ordered Shipman to produce certain additional
documents, primarily financial statements and spreadsheets respecting
auto dealerships. In a deposition later that same month, “Shipman testi-
fied he had produced all such documents in his possession,” but had been
unable to retrieve some relevant data stored on a computer that
“crashed” in 2012.55 However, several days later, “Shipman reported his
son had helped him discover . . . a ‘backup’ folder on his replacement
computer” that contained files from his old computer.56 Responsive doc-
uments from that newly-discovered folder were produced. Then, Shipman
and his attorney submitted affidavits asserting they had diligently
searched Shipman’s physical and electronic files and “produced all re-
sponsive documents.”57 At that point, Shelton filed a second motion to
compel. Therein, Shelton (1) contended that in light of Shipman’s deposi-
tion testimony and belated production, it was “crystal clear” that Ship-
man had “misled” the trial court and “had failed to produce (or even to
search for) entire categories of responsive, discoverable information,”
and (2) requested that “the trial court [ ] compel Shipman to turn over his
49. Id. at 538–39.
50. Id. at 538 (citing In re Christus Santa Rosa Health Sys., 492 S.W.3d 276, 279 (Tex.
2016) (orig. proceeding)).
51. Id. at 539.
52. 540 S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).




57. Id. at 564–65.
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computer for forensic inspection.”58 The trial court ordered Shipman to
produce for forensic examination all his electronically stored files of
every kind for the past seventeen years.59 After Shipman’s petition for
writ of mandamus in the Austin Court of Appeals was denied, Shipman
petitioned the Texas Supreme Court for mandamus relief.
In the Texas Supreme Court, Shipman argued in part (1) “the bare alle-
gations” supporting Shelton’s second motion to compel were “insufficient
to justify such an invasive search” and (2) “the trial court’s order [was]
overly broad.”60 Shelton responded in part that Shipman’s post-deposi-
tion production and equivocal testimony “indicate[d] he [was] incapable
of or unwilling to search his computer for responsive documents.”61 The
supreme court observed that “[a]s a threshold to granting access to elec-
tronic devices, ‘the requesting party must show that the responding party
has somehow defaulted in its obligation to search its records and produce
the requested data.’”62 Further, the supreme court stated, “we do not rely
on ‘mere skepticism or bare allegations that the responding party has
failed to comply with its discovery duties.’”63 Then, the supreme court
stated:
We do not suggest that a requesting party can never establish a dis-
covery-obligation default under Weekley by offering evidence of a
producing party’s technical ineptitude. Nor do we discount trial-
court discretion in determining when that line is crossed. But the
burden imposed by Weekley is high—forensic examination of elec-
tronic devices is “particularly intrusive and should be generally dis-
couraged.” And notably absent from the record here is any
examination of what exactly Shipman’s or his son’s technical capabil-
ities actually are.64
The supreme court held that Shipman’s belated discovery of the
“backup” folder and his “equivocation” at his deposition gave rise “only
to ‘mere skepticism’ that responsive documents remain on Shipman’s
computer” and “is no evidence that he cannot reliably produce respon-
sive documents from his computer.”65 Further, the supreme court stated
that although Shelton “may ultimately be entitled to some relief,” the
trial court’s order was “overly broad” in that “[t]he trial court appeared
to grant greater relief than was sought in [Shelton’s] motion to compel,
and there [was] no apparent connection between the vast majority of the
devices and media the order covers and the documents [Shelton sought],
or justification for its nearly twenty-year reach.”66 The supreme court
58. Id. at 565.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id. at 568.
62. Id. at 568 (quoting In re Weekley Homes, L.P., 295 S.W.3d 309, 317 (Tex. 2009)
(orig. proceeding)).
63. Id. (quoting In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 318).
64. Id. at 569 (citation omitted).
65. Id. at 568–69.
66. Id. at 570.
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concluded, “As such, the trial court abused its discretion and Shipman is
without an adequate remedy on appeal.”67 Accordingly, Shipman’s peti-
tion for writ of mandamus was conditionally granted.
In In re Garza,68 the Texas Supreme Court considered the propriety of
mandamus relief when a discovery sanction would result in the sanc-
tioned party’s claims being significantly compromised. A car being driven
by Carolina Garza collided with a truck owned by UV Logistics, LLC
(Logistics). Garza received medical treatment from Dr. Michael Leonard
and two facilities owned by him. Subsequently, Garza sued Logistics,
claiming past medical expenses of more than $320,473.74.69 Further,
“Garza designated [ ] Leonard as a testifying expert witness and noticed
his deposition.”70 Logistics “had a subpoena duces tecum issued designat-
ing several categories of documents [Leonard] was to produce at his dep-
osition,” but Leonard did not produce those records.71 Logistics filed a
motion “to exclude [ ] Leonard as an expert witness and to exclude” all
medical records and “evidence in any form” regarding her treatment re-
ceived from Leonard and the two facilities described above.72 That mo-
tion was granted by the trial court. After unsuccessfully seeking
mandamus relief from the San Antonio Court of Appeals, Garza peti-
tioned for mandamus relief in the supreme court. Garza contended (1)
the trial “court abused its discretion by sanctioning her for lawful actions
of nonparties” and (2) “the sanctions effectively adjudicated the dispute,
were disproportionate to any alleged violations of rules by the nonparties,
substantively served as death penalty sanctions as to her case, and ren-
dered any eventual remedy by appeal inadequate.”73
The supreme court concluded “the trial court acted arbitrarily and
abused its discretion by imposing sanctions on Garza in the absence of
evidence that she was an [offending party].”74 Then, the supreme court
addressed whether Garza had an adequate remedy by appeal. The su-
preme court concluded that if the evidence in question were excluded
from trial, “then even though Garza’s claims might not be completely
vitiated, they will be significantly compromised.”75 Therefore, “an appeal
[did] not provide an adequate remedy as to the order excluding” that
evidence.76 Accordingly, the supreme court conditionally granted Garza’s
petition for writ of mandamus.
67. Id. (citing In re Weekley Homes, 295 S.W.3d at 322 (concluding mandamus relief
“is available when the trial court compels production beyond the permissible bounds of
discovery”)); see also id. at 565 (quoting In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins. Co., 449 S.W.3d 486, 488
(Tex. 2014) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
68. 544 S.W.3d 836 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
69. Id. at 838.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 838–39.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 839–40.
74. Id. at 842.
75. Id. at 843.
76. Id.
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In re North Cypress Medical Center Operating Co.77 involved the rele-
vance of confidential pricing information sought in discovery. An unin-
sured patient was treated in the emergency room at North Cypress
Medical Center (North Cypress) for injuries sustained in an automobile
accident. North Cypress billed the uninsured patient for the services at its
“full” prices, which totaled $11,037.35, and filed a hospital lien for that
amount. After unsuccessfully seeking a reduction of the bill, the patient
sued North Cypress, “requesting a declaratory judgment that North
Cypress’s charges were unreasonable and its lien invalid to the extent it
exceed[ed] a reasonable and regular rate for services rendered.”78 The
patient served North Cypress with requests for production and interroga-
tories respecting, in part, information about North Cypress’s reimburse-
ment rates from insurers and government payers. North Cypress “moved
for a protective order, asserting [the requests] sought irrelevant informa-
tion” and “it would ‘suffer irreparable harm’ from the disclosure of its
‘confidential and proprietary’ negotiated insurance contracts.”79 The trial
court denied that motion. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain manda-
mus relief in the Fourteenth Houston Court of Appeals, North Cypress
sought mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.
First, the supreme court rejected North Cypress’s position that reim-
bursement rates from insurers and government payers were not relevant
to the patient’s claims about the enforceability of the hospital lien. The
supreme court stated, in part, (1) “because a valid hospital lien may not
secure charges that exceed a reasonable and regular rate, the central issue
in a case challenging such a lien is what a reasonable and regular rate
would be,” and (2) “[w]e fail to see how the amounts a hospital accepts as
payment from most of its patients are wholly irrelevant to the reasonable-
ness of its charges to other patients for the same services.”80 Next, the
supreme court considered North Cypress’s confidentiality concerns. The
supreme court stated:
Nothing in the record indicates that the trial court is unwilling to
issue a protective order in the event North Cypress requests and
demonstrates its entitlement to one. Nor does North Cypress explain
why, in the event it is entitled to a protective order, such relief would
be insufficient to address its concerns.81
Accordingly, the supreme court declined to grant mandamus relief.82 Al-
though the existence of an adequate remedy by appeal was not discussed,
77. 559 S.W.3d 128 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding).
78. Id. at 130.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 133.
81. Id. at 136.
82. Id. at 137. In a dissent joined by two other justices, Chief Justice Hecht stated, in
part, (1) the majority’s conclusion contradicts the recent holding in In re Nat’l Lloyds Ins.
Co., 532 S.W.3d 794, 812–13 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding), “that one party’s attorney’s
fees in a case are generally irrelevant” to the reasonableness of the opposing party’s fees,
and (2) the majority did not address “our concern in [In re Nat’l Lloyds], raised here as
well, that any marginal relevance the requested discovery might have in a particular case is
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the supreme court briefly described the general requirements for manda-
mus relief and cited two cases, In re Prudential83 and In re CSX Corp.84
B. DESIGNATION OF RESPONSIBLE THIRD PARTIES
In In re Coppola,85 the Texas Supreme Court addressed an issue of first
impression respecting the availability of mandamus relief in cases involv-
ing improper denial of a motion to designate responsible third parties.
Following a real estate transaction, the real estate purchaser filed a tort
lawsuit against the vendor. The vendor moved for leave to designate the
purchaser’s transactional attorneys as responsible third parties pursuant
to Section 33.004(a) of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, but
that motion was denied by the trial court.86 After an unsuccessful attempt
to obtain mandamus relief in the First Houston Court of Appeals, the
vendor sought mandamus relief in the supreme court.
The supreme court stated that, pursuant to that statute, trial courts
have no discretion to deny a timely-filed motion to designate responsible
third parties absent a pleading defect and an opportunity to cure.87 As to
timeliness, the supreme court (1) specifically rejected the purchaser’s ar-
gument that Section 33.004(a) “limit[s] the phrase ‘the trial date’ to an
initial trial setting rather than the trial date at the time a motion to desig-
nate is filed” and (2) concluded the vendor’s motion to designate was
timely because it was filed more than sixty days before the date for which
trial was reset.88 Additionally, the supreme court (1) rejected the pur-
chaser’s argument that parties are “categorically prohibited from
designating attorneys as responsible third parties” because that position
“cannot be squared with the statute’s provisions” and (2) reasoned that it
need not determine whether the vendor pleaded sufficient facts regarding
the attorneys’ alleged responsibility because “even if a deficiency existed,
the trial court lacked discretion to deny the motion to designate without
affording [the vendor] an opportunity to replead.”89 The supreme court
conditionally granted the petition for writ of mandamus.
Further, the supreme court rejected the vendor’s “alternative” request
for dismissal of the purchaser’s claims for lack of ripeness, a component
of subject matter jurisdiction that generally “may be raised for the first
outweighed by the real risks of abuse and confusion of the jury.” Id. at 138 (Hecht, C.J.,
dissenting).
83. Id. at 130 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex.
2004) (orig. proceeding) (discussing considerations relevant to whether appellate remedy is
adequate)).
84. Id. at 131 (citing In re CSX Corp., 124 S.W.3d 149, 152 (Tex. 2003) (orig. proceed-
ing) (concluding no adequate appellate remedy exists where discovery order compels pro-
duction of irrelevant documents)).
85. 535 S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
86. Id. at 507; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(a).
87. In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d at 507.
88. Id. at 508.
89. Id. at 508–09.
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time on appeal.”90 The supreme court stated, in part, (1) “[d]ue to the
extraordinary nature of the remedy, the right to mandamus relief gener-
ally requires a predicate request for action” and the “erroneous refusal to
act” and (2) “[t]he record bears nary a hint that ripeness was questioned
in the proceedings below” and the vendor has “not argued or shown that
the facts present one of the ‘rare occasions’ in which the predicate-re-
quest requirement should be relaxed.”91
Additionally, the supreme court observed it had not previously consid-
ered the element of adequate remedy by appeal in the context of a Sec-
tion 33.004 responsible-third-party designation.92 The supreme court
stated it has “explained that ‘adequate’ is merely ‘a proxy for the careful
balance of jurisprudential considerations that determine when appellate
courts will use original mandamus proceedings to review the actions of
lower courts’ and an ‘adequate’ appellate remedy exists when ‘any bene-
fits to mandamus review are outweighed by the detriments.’”93 Then, the
supreme court stated (1) “[a]llowing a case to proceed to trial despite
erroneous denial of a responsible-third-party designation ‘would skew the
proceedings, potentially affect the outcome of the litigation, and compro-
mise the presentation of [the vendor’s] defense in ways unlikely to be
apparent in the appellate record’” and (2) in such case, “[t]he denial of
mandamus review impairs—and potentially denies—a litigant’s signifi-
cant and substantive right to allow the fact finder to determine the pro-
portionate responsibility of all responsible parties.”94 Accordingly, the
supreme court held that “ordinarily, a relator need only establish a trial
court’s abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitlement to mandamus re-
lief with regard to a trial court’s denial of a timely-filed [S]ection
33.004(a) motion.”95
In re Dawson96 involved a defendant’s designation of a responsible
third party after the statute of limitations respecting the plaintiff’s claims
had expired. Plaintiff Melissa Dawson was sitting at a restaurant table
when a television fell from the wall of the restaurant, striking and injuring
her. Dawson sued the restaurant’s owner and operator, Two for Freedom,
LLC, for her injuries. In her discovery requests, Dawson sought, among
other things, (1) “[t]he name and address of the individual(s) who in-
stalled the television” and (2) disclosure pursuant to Texas Rule of Civil
Procedure 194.2(l) of “the name, address, and telephone number of any
person who may be designated as a responsible third party.”97 Two for
90. Id. at 510.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 509.
93. Id. (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding)).
94. Id. (citations omitted).
95. Id. at 510 (citing by comparison In re J.B. Hunt Transport, Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287,
299–300 (Tex. 2016) (orig. proceeding) (holding similarly as to plea of abatement in domi-
nant jurisdiction case)).
96. 550 S.W.3d 625 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
97. Id. at 627; see TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(l).
420 SMU ANNUAL TEXAS SURVEY [Vol. 5
Freedom’s discovery responses stated, in part, “[t]he television in ques-
tion was installed by Michael Graciano.”98 Also, as to Dawson’s request
for disclosure of responsible third parties, Two for Freedom responded,
“[d]efendant will supplement.”99 Two for Freedom did not supplement its
discovery responses before the statute of limitations on Dawson’s claims
expired. Several weeks after that expiration date, Two for Freedom
moved for leave to designate Graciano as a responsible third party, and
the motion was granted by the trial court.100 After being denied manda-
mus relief in the Fort Worth Court of Appeals, Dawson filed a petition
for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court.101
The supreme court observed that under Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code, a defendant may not designate a responsi-
ble third party after limitations have expired “if the defendant has failed
to comply with its obligations, if any, to timely disclose that the person
may be designated as a responsible third party.”102 Also, the supreme
court stated Rule 194.2(l) required Two for Freedom to disclose “the
name, address, and telephone number of any person who may be desig-
nated as a responsible third party.”103 The supreme court concluded that
(1) Two for Freedom’s responses did not satisfy its obligations under Rule
194.2(l) and Section 33.004(d) and (2) therefore, the trial court abused its
discretion by granting leave for Two for Freedom to designate Graciano
as a responsible third party after limitations had expired.104
Next, the supreme court considered whether Dawson lacked an ade-
quate remedy by appeal. The supreme court stated (1) the most frequent
use it has made of mandamus relief “involves cases in which the very act
of proceeding to trial—regardless of the outcome—would defeat the sub-
stantive right involved,”105 and (2) it had recently concluded in In re Cop-
pola that with regard to a trial court’s denial of a timely-filed motion for
leave to designate a responsible third party, “ordinarily, a relator need
only establish a trial court’s abuse of discretion to demonstrate entitle-
ment to mandamus relief.”106 Then, the supreme court stated in part:
The right in In re Coppola was the defendants’ “significant and sub-
stantive right to allow the fact finder to determine the proportionate
responsibility of all responsible parties.” In this case, Dawson seeks
to protect her right, prescribed in [S]ection 33.004(d) of the Texas
Civil Practice and Remedies Code, to not have to try her case against
98. In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d at 627.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 628.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 629 (citing TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.004(d)).
103. Id. (quoting TEX. R. CIV. P. 194.2(l)).
104. Id. at 630 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding)).
105. Id. (quoting In re McAllen Med. Ctr., Inc., 275 S.W.3d 458, 465 (Tex. 2008) (orig.
proceeding)).
106. Id. (quoting In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 510 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding)).
2019] Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions 421
an empty chair. We conclude that mandamus will lie to protect that
right in this circumstance.107
Additionally, the supreme court stated (1) “even though mandamus is
not an equitable remedy, equitable principles largely govern its issuance”;
(2) pursuant to In re Coppola, a defendant is “‘ordinarily’ entitled to
mandamus relief when a trial court erroneously prevents it from designat-
ing a responsible third party”; and (3) therefore, “it seems equitable and
right—at least under these facts—that a plaintiff get the same relief when
a trial court erroneously grants a defendant leave to so designate.”108 Ac-
cordingly, the supreme court conditionally granted the writ of
mandamus.109
In re Xerox Corp.110 presented as a matter of first impression the ques-
tion of whether Texas’s statutory proportionate-responsibility scheme ap-
plies to a civil-remedy action under the Texas Medicaid Fraud Prevention
Act (TMFPA). Pursuant to a contract with the Texas Health and Human
Services Commission, Xerox administered the Texas Medicaid program
for nearly a decade.111 Xerox’s duties included approving or denying
prior-authorization requests for orthodontic services in accordance with
Medicaid policy. The State of Texas sued Xerox for a civil remedy under
TMFPA, alleging Xerox “approv[ed] vast numbers of prior-authorization
requests for ineligible services” and such actions “caused the State to pay
millions of dollars for unauthorized orthodontic services to Medicaid pa-
tients.”112 As authorized by the TMFPA, “the State [sought] treble the
amount of any Medicaid payment made as a result of an unlawful act;
civil penalties of not less than $5,500 per unlawful act; interest on the
amount of unlawfully procured payments; and expenses, costs, and attor-
ney’s fees.”113 Additionally, the State filed separate TMFPA civil actions
against multiple orthodontic service providers who had directly received
disputed Medicaid payments. Xerox filed a motion to designate nearly
seventy of those service providers as responsible third parties under
Chapter 33 of the Texas Civil Practice and Remedies Code, which ad-
dresses proportionate responsibility.114 That motion was denied by the
trial court. After being denied mandamus relief in the Austin Court of
Appeals, Xerox filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Su-
preme Court.115
107. Id. (citations omitted).
108. Id. at 631 (citations omitted).
109. Id.
110. 555 S.W.3d 518, 520 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding).
111. Id. at 520–21.
112. Id. at 521; see TEX. HUM. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 36.001–.132.
113. In re Xerox, 555 S.W.3d at 521.
114. Id.; see TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 33.011(6) (“‘Responsible third
party’ means any person who is alleged to have caused or contributed to causing in any
way the harm for which recovery of damages is sought . . . .”).
115. In re Xerox, 555 S.W.3d at 522. Following the filing of Xerox’s petition for writ of
mandamus in the supreme court, the trial court judge who signed the complained-of order
ceased to hold that office. Id. Pursuant to Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 7.2(b), the
supreme court abated the case to allow the successor trial court judge to reconsider the
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The Texas Supreme Court described the issue before it as “a question
of legislative intent, which we determine as a matter of law using well-
established interpretive principles to construe the statutory language.”116
Based on a lengthy and detailed analysis, the supreme court concluded a
party found liable for violating the TMFPA may not shift the financial
burden of that statute’s civil remedies to other wrongdoers under the pro-
portionate-responsibility statute because “(1) a TMFPA civil-remedy ac-
tion is not an ‘action for recovery of damages’ subject to apportionment,
and (2) the TMFPA’s mitigated fault provision and other financial incen-
tives for informants conflict with [C]hapter 33.”117 Consequently, Xerox’s
petition for writ of mandamus was denied. Although the supreme court
did not reach the element of lack of an adequate remedy by appeal, the
opinion included a cursory mention of both mandamus elements.118
C. GRANTING OF MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL
In re Davenport119 involved a merits-based review of the record to de-
termine whether granting a new trial constituted an abuse of discretion.
The underlying lawsuit was filed by two attorneys against a client to re-
cover unpaid attorney fees. Following a jury verdict partially in favor of
the client, the trial court granted the attorneys’ motion for new trial.120
The trial court found that the parties’ contingency fee agreement “unam-
biguously” provided for recovery of an ownership interest in the client’s
limited partnership as attorney fees.121 After being denied mandamus re-
lief in the San Antonio Court of Appeals as to the granting of a new trial,
the client filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme
Court.122
The supreme court held that the “trial court’s finding was an abuse of
discretion because the agreement unambiguously states that the lawyers
were only entitled to attorney fees from a monetary recovery.”123 Manda-
mus relief was conditionally granted and the trial court was ordered to
vacate its new trial order and render a final judgment consistent with the
supreme court’s opinion.124 As to the element of lack of adequate remedy
ruling in question. See TEX. R. APP. P. 7.2 (b). The successor trial court judge adopted the
prior ruling, and the case then proceeded in the supreme court. See In re Xerox, 555
S.W.3d at 522 n.15.
116. In re Xerox, 555 S.W.3d at 522.
117. Id. at 527–39.
118. See id. at 522 n.17 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36
(Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). The opinion in In re Xerox was delivered on the same date
as In re Dawson, in which the supreme court addressed the element of adequate remedy by
appeal in the context of designation of responsible third parties and relied heavily on In re
Coppola. See In re Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630–31 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. pro-
ceeding) (citing In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 506–07 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig.
proceeding)).




123. Id. at 454.
124. Id. at 459.
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by appeal, the supreme court cited In re Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A.,
Inc.125 and stated in part that pursuant to that case, “[a]n appellate court
may by mandamus direct a trial court to vacate a new trial order . . . when
a merits-based review of the record establishes that the trial court abused
its discretion.”126
D. TRIAL COURT JURISDICTION/AUTHORITY
In re Castle Texas Production Limited Partnership127 addressed the ap-
plicability of mandamus relief when a trial court’s actions went beyond
explicit instructions on remand from the Texas Supreme Court. In 2014,
the Texas Supreme Court issued an opinion respecting accrual of
postjudgment interest in a case involving the relator (Castle), which at
that point had already been proceeding for nearly two decades.128 In that
opinion, the supreme court stated in part that “postjudgment interest
must accrue from the trial court’s final judgment in 2009” and remanded
the case to the trial court “to render judgment for Castle, with postjudg-
ment interest to accrue in accordance with this opinion.”129 On remand,
the trial court issued a letter ruling in which it stated “that the record
must be reopened to ‘determine postjudgment interest including the ac-
crual period.’”130 Castle sought mandamus relief in the Tyler Court of
Appeals respecting that ruling, contending “the trial court exceeded the
scope of the [supreme court’s] mandate by indicating its intent to re-open
the record.”131 Upon the denial of that relief, Castle petitioned for man-
damus relief in the supreme court.132
The supreme court held that the trial court exceeded its authority when
it ordered the reopening of the record and that “[m]andamus relief is
appropriate to enforce our mandate.”133 Specifically, the supreme court
stated, in part, (1) the clear scope of the remand “was simply to render
judgment for Castle with postjudgment interest accruing from the trial
court’s final judgment issued in 2009”; (2) based on that “explicit instruc-
tion to the trial court on a limited remand, the trial court had a ministerial
duty to render judgment for Castle with postjudgment interest to accrue
in accordance with [the supreme court’s] opinion”; (3) there was “no
need to re-open the record to comply with this directive”; and (4) the
supreme court’s instruction for the trial court to proceed “in accordance
with this opinion” was “not . . . an invitation to raise new arguments that
125. Id. at 456 (citing In re Toyota, 407 S.W.3d 746, 758 (Tex. 2013) (orig. proceeding)).
126. Id.
127. 563 S.W.3d 216 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
128. Id. at 217; see Long v. Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd., 426 S.W.3d 73, 75 (Tex. 2014).
129. In re Castle Tex. Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 563 S.W.3d at 217 (quoting Long, 426 S.W.3d at
37 (emphasis omitted)).
130. Id. at 218.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Id. (citing Wells v. Littlefield, 62 Tex. 28, 31) (1884)).
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would require re-opening the record.”134 Further, with respect to lack of
an adequate remedy by appeal, the supreme court (1) noted that the case
“has dragged on for twenty-two years, through multiple appeals, re-
mands,” and more, and (2) stated it was “fully cognizant of the additional
time and resources that would be wasted by the trial court’s decision to
re-open the record despite our directive to render judgment and finally
dispose of this case.”135
In In re Red Dot Building System, Inc.,136 the Texas Supreme Court
addressed dominant jurisdiction respecting two “inherently interrelated”
lawsuits brought in two different Texas counties. Venue was proper in
either county. The supreme court concluded “the court in which the suit
was first filed acquire[d] dominant jurisdiction.”137 Therefore, the second-
filed lawsuit should have been abated and mandamus relief was proper to
secure that result.138 The supreme court conditionally granted mandamus
relief directing the second court to vacate its anti-suit injunction and
grant the defendant’s plea in abatement in that court.139 The supreme
court stated it had recently made clear that in such circumstances, “if the
court in the second action abuses its discretion by not abating the action,
no additional showing is required for mandamus relief” and “[a] relator
need only establish a trial court’s abuse of discretion to demonstrate enti-
tlement to mandamus relief with regard to a plea in abatement in a domi-
nant-jurisdiction case.”140
In re Accident Fund General Insurance Co.141 involved exclusive juris-
diction respecting workers’ compensation claims. An injured employee
sued his workers’ compensation carrier, asserting claims premised on al-
legations that the “bona fide offer of employment” process required by
the Texas workers’ compensation system was misused to fabricate
grounds for firing him. The carrier filed a plea to the jurisdiction in the
trial court, contending the Texas Division of Workers’ Compensation had
exclusive jurisdiction over the employee’s claims because the employee’s
administrative remedies had not been exhausted.142 Following the denial
of that plea and an unsuccessful attempt to obtain mandamus relief in the
Corpus Christi-Edinburg Court of Appeals, the carrier successfully ob-
tained mandamus relief in the Texas Supreme Court.143
134. Id. (citing Long, 426 S.W.3d at 89; Phillips v. Bramlett, 407 S.W.3d 229, 234 (Tex.
2013)).
135. Id. (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig.
proceeding)).
136. 504 S.W.3d 320, 321 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
137. Id. at 322.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 324.
140. Id. at 322 (citing In re J.B. Hunt Transp., Inc., 492 S.W.3d 287, 299–300 (Tex. 2016)
(orig. proceeding)).
141. 543 S.W.3d 750, 751 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
142. Id. at 752.
143. Id. at 755.
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The supreme court held that employee’s claims against the carrier
“arise out of the statutory claims-handling process and, as a result, the
current [Workers’ Compensation Act] with its definitions, detailed proce-
dures, and dispute resolution process demonstrate[s] legislative intent for
there to be no alternative remedies.”144 Further, the supreme court stated
in part “[b]ecause the Division has exclusive jurisdiction over [the em-
ployee’s] claims against [the carrier] and [the employee] did not exhaust
administrative remedies through the workers’ compensation system
before filing suit, allowing those claims to proceed in the trial court would
disrupt the orderly process of government” and “[t]hus, mandamus relief
for [the carrier] is appropriate.”145
In In re Elizondo,146 the Texas Supreme Court addressed the trial
court’s plenary power to amend a previous trial court order. Elizondo
hired M&O Homebuilders and others (collectively, the Builders) to build
a home. After a cost dispute arose, Elizondo sued the Builders for breach
of contract and “placed a lien on the Builders’ property on the theory
that the Builders had improved it using funds intended for his home.”147
The Builders contended the lien was invalid, filed a motion to remove it,
and submitted to the trial court an order drafted by them titled “Order on
Defendants’ Summary Motion to Remove Invalid Lien.”148 That order
contained the following finality phrase: “This judgment is final, disposes
of all claims and all parties, and is appealable. All relief not granted
herein is denied.”149 Elizondo did not file a notice of appeal within thirty
days of the trial court signing the order. Weeks later, Elizondo requested
an amended order after realizing that the “original order had disposed of
his entire case.”150 When the trial court signed and issued the amended
order, the Builders filed for mandamus relief in the First Houston Court
of Appeals, which directed the trial court to vacate the amended order.
Elizondo then sought a “writ of mandamus directing the court of appeals
to vacate its opinion,” from the supreme court.151
The supreme court stated that the court of appeals correctly concluded
that in determining finality of an order when there has not been a con-
ventional trial on the merits, a reviewing court is “to look at the record
only if the order [i]s not clear and unequivocal.”152 Then, the supreme
court rejected Elizondo’s argument that the original order was ambigu-
ous.153 Specifically, the supreme court stated, in part, (1) “the title and
144. Id. at 754 (quoting Tex. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Rottiger, 381 S.W.3d 430, 444 (Tex. 2012)).
145. Id. at 754–55 (citing In re Crawford & Co., 458 S.W.3d 920, 928–29 (Tex. 2015)
(per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re Entergy Corp., 142 S.W.3d 316, 321–22 (Tex. 2004)
(orig. proceeding)).





151. Id. at 826.
152. Id. at 827 (citing Lehmann v. Har-Con Corp., 39 S.W.3d 191, 205–06 (Tex. 2001)).
153. Id. at 827–28 (citing In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d 247, 248–49 (Tex. 2010) (per
curiam) (orig. proceeding); Lehmann, 39 S.W.3d at 195–206).
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the finality phrase admit of only one construction: the order (correctly)
removes a lien and (incorrectly) disposes of Elizondo’s other claims” and
(2) the original order “may lack a basis in law, but it is not ambiguous.”154
Further, the supreme court stated that its “conclusion that the original
order was final also decide[d] the issue of whether the amended order
was void as an attempt to correct judicial error.”155 According to the su-
preme court:
The trial court’s inclusion of the finality phrase in the original order
constituted judicial error. It is settled that only errors made in enter-
ing a judgment are clerical; an error in rendition is judicial. Here, . . .
the trial court signed an order that one of the parties submitted. As
such, the finality phrase was part of the judgment that the trial court
rendered. Since the amended order sought to correct judicial error
after the trial court’s plenary power had expired, the amended order
was void.156
Consequently, the supreme court denied Elizondo’s petition for writ of
mandamus.157 Although the supreme court made no mention of the man-
damus element of lack of an adequate remedy by appeal, the opinion
contained numerous citations and comparisons to In re Daredia, a case in
which the supreme court stated mandamus was proper where an order is
void because an adequate remedy is lacking in such circumstances.158
E. APPOINTMENT/DISQUALIFICATION OF COUNSEL
In re Turner159 involved the issue of “whether a law firm must be dis-
qualified after [employing] a paralegal who had previously worked for
the opposing party’s [law firm].”160 The law firm that had first employed
the paralegal, Vethan Law Firm, filed a motion to disqualify the second
firm, The Cweren Law Firm, because of the paralegal’s work on the same
case at both firms.161 The trial court denied that motion. Although
Vethan’s attempt to obtain mandamus relief in the Fourteenth Houston
Court of Appeals was unsuccessful, mandamus relief was conditionally
granted in the Texas Supreme Court.162 The supreme court stated: (1) “to
rebut the rebuttable presumption that a nonlawyer employee imparted
confidential information obtained at her previous employment, the hiring
firm must demonstrate that it instructed the nonlawyer employee to re-
frain from working on any matter on which she worked in any previous
employment”; (2) “[t]he failure to provide this general instruction to a
new employee creates an unacceptable risk of disclosure, even if the hir-
154. Id. at 828.
155. Id. at 829.
156. Id. (citations omitted).
157. Id.
158. Id. at 827–28; see In re Daredia, 317 S.W.3d at 250.
159. 542 S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
160. Id. at 554.
161. Id. at 555.
162. Id. at 558.
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ing firm is unaware of the new employee’s specific conflict”; and (3)
“[h]ere, the record demonstrates that Cweren did not provide this in-
struction until after it discovered [the employee’s] conflict.”163 Addition-
ally, the supreme court stated, “Mandamus is available where a motion to
disqualify is inappropriately denied as there is no adequate remedy on
appeal.”164
In In re State of Texas,165 the Texas Supreme Court addressed whether
a civilly committed sex offender was entitled to appointed counsel in a
proceeding to amend his commitment order. The offender was civilly
committed in 2010 pursuant to the Civil Commitment of Sexually Violent
Predators Act contained in Chapter 841 of the Texas Health and Safety
Code.166 More than five years later, the State of Texas filed a motion to
amend the offender’s civil commitment order to conform to the Act’s
2015 amendments. The amended Act requires, among other things, “com-
mitment to a tiered treatment program that includes the possibility of
total confinement, while the Act’s previous version provided for outpa-
tient treatment only.”167 The trial court denied a motion for appointment
of counsel filed by the offender “and, after a hearing, signed an amended
commitment order.”168 The offender sought and obtained mandamus re-
lief in the Beaumont Court of Appeals, which ordered the trial court “to
vacate its orders and appoint counsel to represent the [offender] in fur-
ther proceedings on the State’s motion [to amend].”169 Then, the State
filed a petition for writ of mandamus in the supreme court, contending
the court of appeals abused its discretion by “erroneously [construing]
the Act to entitle [the offender] to representation by counsel in . . . [the]
modification proceeding solely because he already had appointed counsel
in his then-pending biennial review” as required under the Act.170
The supreme court stated in part, “We may review a court of appeals’
issuance of a writ of mandamus to determine if it constituted a clear
abuse of discretion. . . . In doing so, however, our focus remains on the
trial court’s order.”171 Based on the provisions of the Act, the supreme
court concluded that the court of appeals had abused its discretion by
concluding the offender was statutorily entitled to appointed counsel for
purposes of the State’s motion to amend.172 Then, the supreme court
turned to constitutional due process arguments asserted by the offender
in both courts below, but not reached by the court of appeals. The su-
preme court stated in part:
163. Id. at 556–57 (citing In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., L.P., 320 S.W.3d 819,
824 (Tex. 2010) (orig. proceeding)).
164. Id. at 555 (citing In re Columbia Valley Healthcare Sys., 320 S.W.3d at 824 n.2).
165. 556 S.W.3d 821, 822 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding).
166. Id. at 824–25; see TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ANN. §§ 841.001–.151.
167. State, 556 S.W.3d at 822.
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 826.
171. Id. (citations omitted).
172. Id. at 828.
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The State argues that by reurging these unaddressed arguments here,
[the offender] “effectively asks this Court to exercise mandamus ju-
risdiction in the first instance” without stating a compelling reason
for doing so. We disagree. [The offender] presented his mandamus
petition, which included his due process arguments, to the court of
appeals. He presents these same arguments here as an alternative
ground to deny the State’s petition. That the court of appeals chose
to grant [the offender’s] petition for different reasons does not pre-
clude us from addressing the arguments he raised.173
Further, following an analysis that took into account “the liberty inter-
est at stake, the risk of erroneous depravation, and the State’s interest,”
the supreme court concluded “the minimum process to which [the of-
fender] is entitled in connection with the State’s motion to amend his
commitment order to conform to the Act’s 2015 amendments does not
include appointed counsel.”174 Accordingly, the supreme court concluded
(1) “the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying [the offender’s]
request for appointed counsel on the State’s motion to modify his civil
commitment order” and (2) “the court of appeals abused its discretion in
granting [the offender] mandamus relief.”175 The State’s petition for writ
of mandamus was conditionally granted and the court of appeals was or-
dered to vacate its own order conditionally granting mandamus relief.176
The supreme court did not specifically address the element of no ade-
quate remedy by appeal, but cited In re Cerberus Capital Management,
L.P., in which the supreme court stated in part, “Mandamus is appropri-
ate to correct an erroneous order disqualifying counsel because there is
no adequate remedy by appeal.”177
F. LAWSUIT FORUM
The issue in In re Mahindra, USA Inc.178 was whether certain survival
and wrongful death claims fell within an exception to the doctrine of fo-
rum non conveniens. The decedent was killed at his home in Mississippi
while working on a tractor sold to him in Mississippi by Mahindra USA,
Inc. The decedent’s death was allegedly the result of a hydraulic line rup-
ture that caused him to be crushed by the tractor’s front-end loader,
which was manufactured by KMW, Ltd., a Kansas corporation. The inci-
dent was witnessed by the decedent’s fourteen-year-old granddaughter,
Faith, who was visiting from Texas at the time. Jason Cooper, the dece-
dent’s eldest son and a resident of Texas, filed a lawsuit in Texas against
Mahindra and KMW, asserting claims for negligence and products liabil-
173. Id. (citations omitted).
174. Id. at 830 (citing Morissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972)).
175. Id. at 831.
176. Id.
177. See id. at 827 (citing In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex.
2005) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)).
178. 549 S.W.3d 541, 543 (Tex. 2018) (orig. proceeding).
2019] Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions 429
ity.179 Jason sued the defendants in his individual capacity, “as adminis-
trator of his father’s estate, and as next friend of his daughter, Faith.”180
Additionally, Christopher Cooper, another son of the decedent who is
also a Texas resident, joined the lawsuit individually as a plaintiff.181
Mahindra moved to dismiss the lawsuit based on forum non conveniens,
contending Mississippi was a more appropriate forum.182 The trial court
denied that motion. After an unsuccessful attempt to obtain mandamus
relief in the First Houston Court of Appeals, Mahindra filed a petition for
writ of mandamus in the Texas Supreme Court.
As a threshold matter, the supreme court stated (1) when a trial court
denies a motion to dismiss, “the movant cannot obtain a final judgment,
and no immediate appeal is available” and (2) in such circumstances, “we
have held the writ of mandamus to be an appropriate remedy to correct
the court’s abuse of discretion.”183 Further, the supreme court observed
that the doctrine of forum non conveniens is codified as part of the Texas
survival and wrongful death act.184 That “codified version includes a
Texas-residency exception that excludes certain claims from the doctrine
because they are either prosecuted by a Texas-resident plaintiff or deriva-
tive of a Texas decedent.”185
Mahindra contended that although Jason and Christopher reside in
Texas, the Texas-residency exception was inapplicable because (1) “only a
plaintiff may invoke the exception and Jason and Christopher are not
plaintiffs under an applicable definition of that term,” and (2) “Jason and
Christopher are ‘derivative claimants’ of their father and, as such, may
not invoke the exception because their father was not a Texas resi-
dent.”186 In support of those contentions, Mahindra cited what it con-
tended was applicable Mississippi law.187
The supreme court rejected Mahindra’s arguments. Specifically, the su-
preme court stated in part (1) forum non conveniens “goes to process
rather than substantive rights” and therefore Texas law applied; (2) not-
withstanding Jason’s representative claims as administrator of his father’s
estate and next friend of Faith, both Jason and Christopher asserted indi-
vidual wrongful death claims and “are not nominal or representative
plaintiffs with respect to their own individual damages”; (3) “as plaintiffs
and legal residents of Texas,” Jason and Christopher were entitled to in-




182. Id. at 543–44.
183. Id. at 545 (citing In re Gen. Elec. Co., 271 S.W.3d 681, 694 (Tex. 2008) (orig. pro-
ceeding); In re Pirelli Tire, LLC, 247 S.W.3d 670, 679 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding)).
184. See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.051.
185. In re Mahindra, USA Inc., 549 S.W.3d at 543; see CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§ 71.051(e).
186. In re Mahindra, USA Inc., 549 S.W.3d at 544–45 (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE
§§ 71.051(h)(1)–(2)).
187. Id.
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the representative claims asserted by Jason, subsection 71.051(b) allows
for trial court consideration of certain statutory factors in deciding
whether to grant a motion to dismiss under the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, including a “duplication-of-litigation factor,” and the record
in this case did not show all of the statutory factors conclusively favored
the alternative forum.188 Consequently, the supreme court concluded that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion by denying Mahindra’s motion
to dismiss and denied the writ of mandamus.189
V. TEXAS SUPREME COURT’S APPROACH TO
ADDRESSING ADEQUATE REMEDY
As illustrated by the cases described above, the Texas Supreme Court
addresses the lack of adequate remedy element in varying depth. The
chart below groups those cases according to the supreme court’s level of




OPINION SUBJECT MATTER OF CASE & 





of adequacy of 
party’s appellate 
remedy 
In re Coppola, 535 
S.W.3d 506 (Tex. 
2017) (per curiam) 
Designation of Parties: Trial 
court improperly denied motion 
to designate real estate 
purchaser’s attorney as 
responsible third party without 
opportunity to replead 
Granted 
In re Garza, 544 
S.W.3d 836 (Tex. 
2018) (per curiam)
Discovery: T. ct. improperly 
imposed discovery sanctions on 
plaintiff in absence of evidence 
plaintiff was an offender 
Granted 
In re Dawson, 550 
S.W.3d 625 (Tex. 
2018) (per curiam)
Designation of Parties: T. ct. 
improperly allowed defendant to 
designate contractor as 
responsible third party after 
limitations expired 
Granted 
In re Castle Tex. 
Prod. Ltd. P’ship, 
2018 WL 6005073 
Authority: T. ct. exceeded its 
authority by taking action 
beyond scope of supreme court’s 




statement as to 
adequacy of 
appellate remedy 
In re Red Dot 
Bldg. Sys., Inc., 
504 S.W.3d 320 
(Tex. 2016) (per 
curiam) 
Jurisdiction: Because t. ct. in 
which suit was first filed 
acquired dominant jurisdiction, 
t. ct. in second-filed suit 
improperly denied plea in 
abatement 
Granted 
188. Id. at 547–50 (citing CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 71.051(b)–(e); Am. Dredging
Co. v. Miller, 510 U.S. 443, 453 (1994)).
189. Id. at 550.
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In re Shipman, 540 
S.W.3d 562 (Tex. 
2018) (per curiam)
Discovery: T. ct. improperly 
ordered overbroad forensic 
examination of all electronic 
devices of party who appeared 
unable to conduct proper search 
of computer 
Granted 
In re Silver, 540 
S.W.3d 530 (Tex. 
2018)  
Discovery: T. ct. improperly 
compelled production of emails 
between inventor and his non-
attorney patent agent because 
lawyer-client privilege applied 
Granted 
In re Mahindra, 
USA Inc., 549 
S.W.3d 541 (Tex. 
2018)  
Lawsuit Forum: T. ct.’s denial of 
motion to dismiss claims based 
on forum non conveniens was 
consistent with applicable law 




not addressed, but 
case(s) cited 
In re State Farm 
Lloyds, 520 
S.W.3d 595 (Tex. 
2017)  
Discovery: T. ct. should be 
allowed to reconsider order as to 
format of electronic discovery, in 
light of supreme court’s new 
guidelines 
Denied 
In re Davenport, 
522 S.W.3d 452 
(Tex. 2017) 
New Trial: Appellate ct. should 
have vacated t. ct’s new trial 
order where merits-based review 
of record showed no justification 
for t. ct.’s interpretation of 
parties’ contract 
Granted 
In re Nat’l Lloyds 
Ins. Co., 532 
S.W.3d 794 (Tex. 
2017) 
Discovery: T. ct. improperly 
ordered production of attorney-
billing information because such 
information was work product 
and was irrelevant in insurance 
case  
Granted 
In re Turner, 542 
S.W.3d 553 (Tex. 
2017) (per curiam)
Disqualification of Counsel: T. 
ct. improperly denied motion to 
disqualify law firm that 
employed opposing party’s 
paralegal 
Granted 
In re Accident 
Fund Gen. Ins. 
Co., 543 S.W.3d 
750 (Tex. 2017) 
(per curiam) 
Jurisdiction: T. ct. improperly 
denied plea to jurisdiction 
because workers’ compensation 
division had exclusive 
jurisdiction 
Granted 
In re Elizondo, 
544 S.W.3d 824 
(Tex. 2018) (per 
curiam) 
Jurisdiction: App. ct. correctly 
concluded t. ct.’s amended order 
was void, where order sought to 
correct judicial error after 
plenary power expired 
Denied 
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In re N. Cypress 
Med. Ctr. 
Operating Co., 
Ltd., 2018 WL 
1974376 (Tex. 
2018)  
Discovery: T. ct. did not abuse 
discretion in concluding 
insurance reimbursement rates 
were relevant in lawsuit by 
uninsured patient respecting 
amount of hospital lien  
Denied 
In re Xerox Corp., 
555 S.W.3d 518 
(Tex. 2018)  
Designation of Parties: T. ct. 
properly concluded civil remedy 
action under Medicaid fraud act 




In re State of Tex., 
556 S.W.3d 821 
(Tex. 2018)  
Appointment of Counsel: App. 
ct. improperly concluded sex 
offender was entitled to 
appointed counsel respecting 




The percentage of cases in which the filing of a petition for mandamus
relief in the Texas Supreme Court results in the granting of that relief has
varied little over the past seven years and consistently remains under
eight percent.190 Additionally, although the supreme court often merely
cites prior cases in addressing the lack of an adequate remedy on appeal,
the supreme court has by no means abandoned the application of a de-
tailed analytical approach to that element when unique circumstances are
presented.191 Thus, the evolution of the remedy of mandamus continues
to be guided by the well-established principles that mandamus is an ex-
traordinary and discretionary remedy that “depends heavily on the cir-
cumstances presented.”192 Further, the discretionary nature of mandamus
was especially highlighted during this Survey period in In re State Farm
Lloyds, in which the supreme court took the rare approach of neither
granting nor denying mandamus relief on the merits, but rather utilizing
the “opportunity” to “elucidate the guiding principles informing the exer-
cise of discretion over electronic-discovery disputes.”193
190. See supra notes 24–27 and accompanying text; see also Hon. Douglas S. Lang &
Rachel A. Campbell, Survey of Recent Mandamus Decisions of the Texas Supreme Court, 3
SMU ANN. TEX. SURV. 265, 267 (2017), https://scholar.smu.edu/smuatxs/vol3/iss1/ [https://
perma.cc/35X6-DQPN].
191. See In re Coppola, 535 S.W.3d 506, 508 (Tex. 2017) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding);
In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d 836, 840–41 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding); In re
Dawson, 550 S.W.3d 625, 630–31 (Tex. 2018) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding).
192. In re Garza, 544 S.W.3d at 840 (citing In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d
124, 136 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)).
193. In re State Farm Lloyds, 520 S.W.3d 595, 599, 615 (Tex. 2017) (orig. proceeding).
